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Abstract
In conducting experiments with multiple trials, outcomes from previous trials can
impact on current behavior.  One of the most obvious cases in which this can happen, and
the case considered in this paper, is in an auction market experiment, where earnings from
previous auction trials alter cash balances which, in turn, can affect bidding behavior. (The
most obvious mechanism for such a result, within standard theory, is if bidders are risk
averse and do not have constant absolute risk aversion. One can imagine a number of non-
standard reasons for such effects as well.) Use of OLS regressions with cash balances
included as a right hand side variable are likely to lead to a biased estimate of the cash
balance effect since the variation in cash balances is largely related to differences in bidding
strategies across individuals. Fixed effect regressions can commonly control for these
endogeniety problems at the potential cost of obtaining inefficient estimates, since this
estimator does not exploit between-individual variation. This paper addresses this problem
in two ways. First we consider an experimental design that reduces the potential bias of OLS
estimates while increasing the precision of fixed effect estimates. Second, we consider
instrumental variables estimation of the cash balance effect where the instruments are
produced by the experimental design. To the best of our knowledge, neither of these
approaches has been explored in the experimental literature.
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Divisions of NSF for financial support. We are responsible for all errors.1 There is considerable controversy surrounding the question of whether bidding above the risk neutral Nash
equilibrium in first-price auctions in fact results from risk aversion or some other unexplained factors (see
Kagel, 1995; also Cox, Smith and Walker, 1992 and Kagel and Roth, 1992).  Nevertheless the question of
potential effects of changing cash balances in private value auctions remains of interest.
In this paper we investigate the role of individual cash balances on bidding behavior
in affiliated private value auctions. An important, yet unresolved, question in experimental
economics is whether or not cash balances play a role in multi period laboratory experiments.
The typical experimental design will have a series of twenty to thirty auctions in which a
winner will be declared each auction period and subjects will be paid their cumulative
earnings from the experimental session.  Current and past  earnings will impact on subjects’
current cash balances, which in turn can affect their future bidding.  For example, in common
value auctions, where bidders are subject to the winner’s curse, legitimate arguments can be
made for higher cash balances either increasing or decreasing individual bids, other things
equal (Hansen and Lott, 1991; Kagel and Levin, 1991).  Alternatively, in a one-shot auction
low cash balances may promote more aggressive bidding as subjects are no longer liable for
all of their losses. However, in a sequence of auctions low cash balances may promote less
aggressive bidding as bankruptcy will result in removal from the auction and lost profit
opportunities in later auctions.   In first-price private value auctions, where bankruptcies are
typically not a problem, there is persistent bidding above the risk neutral Nash equilibrium
reference point, which may be accounted for by bidder risk aversion.  To the extent that
bidders are indeed risk averse, only in the case of constant absolute risk aversion will cash
balances not affect bidding.
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 The few experimental studies that explicitly consider a role for cash balances in the
bid function typically treat it  as an exogenous explanatory variable in a regression estimating
the bid function (Hansen and Lott 1991 or Kagel and Levin 1991). There are two possible
problems with this approach. First, there may be insufficient variation in the cash balances
variable to identify its effect in the bid function. Moreover, the available variation in current
cash balances across individuals is usually entirely related to differences in past bidding
strategies across individuals. If unobserved differences in bidding behavior are correlated
over time for the same individual (as is likely to be the case), then introducing cash balances
as an explanatory variable is likely to lead to a simultaneous equation problem. Fixed effectregressions address the second (simultaneity) problems  at the cost of accentuating the
problem of insufficient variation in cash balances, since this estimator does not utilize
between-individual variation.
This paper addresses the above issues in two ways. First we consider an experimental
design that increases the exogenous variation in cash balances. In this design we randomly
assign a bonus (which may be positive or negative) to each individual in each auction period.
This randomization will reduce the potential bias of OLS estimates and increase the precision
of fixed effect estimates. Second, we consider instrumental variables estimators of the cash
balance effect, where the instruments are  based on these (random) bonuses and other
exogenous variables (e.g. previous signals) produced by the experimental design. 
Our  paper  makes three contributions to the existing literature in experimental
economics. Firstly, it applies simultaneous equation techniques to the estimation of economic
relationships from experimental data, and notes that experiments produce a number of
variables which are valid instrumental variables. Second, we demonstrate how the sample
design may be altered to reduce simultaneity problems and increase the efficiency of
econometric estimators. Third. we provide substantial new evidence on the effects of cash
balance in affiliated private value auction experiments. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the structure of affiliated
private  value  auction  experiments.  In  Section  III,  we  discuss  different econometric
approaches to estimating the cash balance effect in standard experimental designs.  In section
IV,  we  propose  a  randomization  strategy  and discuss how this approach will affect
simultaneity  and  efficiency  problems  in  experiments. In section V we discuss our
experimental design. Section VI contains our empirical results. We find that in standard
sample sizes that the random effects and  fixed effects estimators perform relatively well.
They produce  negative estimates of the cash balance effect which are relatively precise but
which show some sensitivity to how we model the adjustment process. Instrumental variable
estimates are very unstable, suggesting that standard sample sizes (50 individuals over 30
periods) are insufficient to allow the desirable asymptotic properties of IV estimation to hold.
Finally, our results suggest that researcher may want to consider specifying more flexible
forms of the adjustment process within an experiment. We conclude the paper in Section VII.2 In the KHL experiment e refers to the maximum range from xo a resale value can be created. It is
symmetric and is determined by the experimenter.
3 Bids are restricted to be nonnegative.
4 This expression is valid only for the case where  xo is not known The variable Yi is calculated
as Yi= 2e / (n + 1) * exp -{[n / 2e][xi - (xl + e)]}.  This becomes negligible rapidly as x moves beyond xl + e.
Section II: Structure of Affiliated Private Value Auction Experiments
We begin with a description of affiliated private auction experiments.  In a affiliated
private value auction each bidder has perfect information regarding her own value for the
object at auction. However, private information across bidders is positively correlated, and
higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely.
Typically experimenters design their experiments as follows. A complete description of the
structure of such an experiment is provided in Kagel, Levin and Harstad (henceforth referred
to as KLH) (1987).  In each auction period, a random number xo, is drawn from a uniform
distribution on the interval [xl, xu].  Each subject receives a private information signal (resale
value) xi, which is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution centered on xo with upper
bound xo + e and lower bound x o - e.,
2 where epsilon is set by the researcher.   The
distribution underlying the signal values, the value of e and the interval [xl, xu] are common
knowledge, but subjects do not know the value of xo. The value of e usually varies across
auctions and all changes are announced.  Given xi, e, and the endpoint values, each bidder
can compute an upper and lower bound on the value of xo.
In each period the commodity is sold to the high bidder in the period (these are first
price auctions). The high bidder earns profits equal to the private signal (xi) less the amount
bid.  The other bidders earn zero profits for that auction period. 
3 After each round, the value
of  xo, the bids (in descending order) and the earnings of (but not the identity of) the high
bidder are announced.
For private information signals in the interval [xl  + e, xu - e], the risk neutral Nash
equilibrium bid function is xi - 2e/n + Yi/n where Yi is a negative exponential and n is the
number of bidders.
4 The expected RNNE profit per period is approximately equal to 2e/N.
In these models, each agent bids as if she has received the highest signal since this is when
she wins and her cash balances increase. In a first-price auction, it is clear that bidders should
bid below their private resale values.  5  An additional problem with the earlier work is that regressions were not restricted to the region [xl  + e,
xu - e] where the RNNE bid function does not change.
Important questions of interest to previous researchers are i) how far below these
resale values do subjects discount (i. e. how much to discount) and ii) what are the operating
principles underlying these bids. A garden variety estimating equation for the bid function
is given by
Bit =  a+ (1 RVit + (2 C it + (3 t
 -1 + (4 eit + uit.        (1)
The bid (B) is a linear function of a constant, the resale value (RV), cash balances
prior to the bid (C), half of the total range the value of e which determines the range around
xo from which the resale value can be drawn, and a time trend (1/t) which captures the
learning and adjustment process in the session. Many researchers omit cash balances as an
explanatory variable. However, it is interesting to examine the effect of cash balances in this
equation. If this effect is significantly different from zero, this can indicate i) deviations from
constant absolute risk aversion or ii) subjects evaluating outcomes in terms of deviations
from the current status quo in each auction period. Moreover, if cash balances have a
significant effect on bidding behavior, one cannot treat the auction series as a collection of
single shot auctions.  
In a recent survey, Kagel (1995) concludes that the cash balance variable does not
achieve statistical significance at anything approaching conventional levels in affiliated
private value auction experiments.  However, previous evidence  is potentially misleading
since previous studies have only limited variation in the cash balance variable. Moreover, the
available variation in this variable is likely to be endogenous, since it is based on past
bidding behavior, and one would expect unobservables affecting past and current bidding
behavior to be correlated.
5  In the next section we discuss how standard econometric
approaches  to  simultaneous  equation bias may be employed to address the issue of
endogenous cash balances. In section IV we show how endogeneity problems may be
reduced and the efficiency of econometric estimation may be increased by altering the
experimental design.6 Here we are ignoring for simplicity the fact that the error terms will be correlated across time for the same
individual, and that a random effects estimator should be used to estimate (2). However, the same argument
will go through for a random effects estimator but the notation will become more complex. Alternatively,
one can adjust the estimated covariance matrix for the OLS estimation of the parameters to allow for this
correlation in the error structure.  See Hsiao (1986) for a comprehensive discussion of estimators
appropriate for panel data, including random and fixed effect estimators. 
7Note that simultaneous equation bias will not be a problem with any of the other explanatory variables in
(1) as these variables are randomly generated in the experiment.
Section III:  Problems of Efficiency and Simultaneity in Experiments 
For expository purposes, assume for now that cash balances is the only variable that
affects bidding behavior. (The other explanatory variables in the bid function (1) are
randomly generated each period and thus are orthogonal to current cash balances. Thus this
modification will not generally affect the results but will simplify our discussion). Thus we
rewrite (1) as 
Bit =  a+ (Cit + uit .                  (2)
Now suppose  for the  moment that simultaneity is not an issue. The estimated variance of
the OLS estimate of the cash balance effect in equation (2) equals
Var( ols) = 
2[Eit(Cit -  )
2]
-1,         (3)
)
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where 
2  is the variance of the error term in (2).
6  Thus the variance of the OLS estimator ) s
is (inversely) proportional to the variance in cash balances, and if there is insufficient
variance in cash balances, the estimated coefficient  will be imprecise. As a result, one may
not be able to reject the hypothesis that it is significantly different from zero, and researchers
may draw the inference that cash balances do not affect bidding behavior when in fact that
is the case.
 Next consider the possibility that the OLS estimator may suffer from simultaneous
equation bias due to correlation between cash balances and the error term in (2).
7 As noted
above, current cash balances are likely to act as a proxy for lagged values of the dependent
variable. Individuals start with identical cash balances, and cash balances only change as a
result of profits and losses resulting from previous bidding behavior. Thus cash balances are8For simplicity, in equation (6) we have ignored the fact that the estimate of s
2 will differ between the OLS
and fixed effect estimator. Note that if we compare the fixed effect estimator to a random effects estimator,
this difference will be eliminated.
9Hausman (1978) offers a test of whether the coefficients are being biased by adopting a random effects
specification versus the fixed effects specification.
likely to be correlated with the error term in (2), and the inconsistency in the OLS estimate
is given by
plim( ols - () = plim( Eit Cituit /N) / plim(Eit(Cit -  )
2 /N),      (4)
)
g C
where N is the sample size.
Some researchers have addressed this problem by adopting an error components
structure for the residual in equation (1) or (2),
uit =  hi +vit ,                                                                                                                             (5)
and assuming that the cause of the correlation between cash balances and the residual is
correlation between cash balances and the permanent component hi. If one treats hi. as a
parameter to be estimated, consistent estimates can be obtained from a fixed effect (FE)
estimator. However, the cost of obtaining consistency in this fashion is an increase in the
variance of the estimated cash balances coefficient. This variance is now given by
8 
Var( fe) = 
2[Eit(Cit -  i )
2]
-1 .        (6)
)
g ) s C
The FE estimator only considers variation around individual means and thus the expected
value of the variance in (6) will be greater than the expected value of (3).
9
  An alternative to the fixed effect procedure would use an instrumental variables (IV)
approach such as two stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate equation (2).  To implement
2SLS estimation of (1) or (2), we need to find instrumental variables. An instrumental
variable must have two properties.  First, it must be uncorrelated with the error term in (1)
or (2).  Second, it must be correlated (preferably highly correlated) with cash balances.10A third instrument aims to proxy the probability that the individual who receives the highest actually wins
that auction round.  The instrument is calculated by taking the difference between the signal values of the
highest and second highest signal received, divided by the range over which signals could be drawn in that
round (2e).  We would expect that when this number is small the second highest signal holder is more likely
to win the auction round.  An examination of this data, reveals that approximately 90% of the time that the
high signal holder did not win the auction round can be found where the value of this instrument is less than
10%.
11 In practice when estimating (1) by 2SLS, one would also include the other explanatory variables from (1)
in the first stage equation. We would not expect them to play much role in explaining cash balances given
that they are randomly generated.
 A natural instrumental variable in our setting is of the total number of high signals
received prior to the current period, since individuals receiving the high signal in a given
period are the most likely to have the winning bid in that period, as predicted by Nash
equilibrium bidding strategy. By the same reasoning, the total number of previous periods
that the individual received the second highest signal is a second potential instrumental
variable. In Table 1, we present summary statistics from KHL (1987) which indicate that the
individuals who drew the two highest signals won almost 99% of the auctions.  Moreover,
whether an individual has the highest or second highest signal is in a given period is
determined randomly for each individual and will be uncorrelated the error term. (Note that
these variables are also valid instruments for real bidding equation (1)). Thus we regress cash
balances on the instruments in the first stage equation
Cit =  A0+ A1D1it + A2D2itt + witt ,      (7)
where D1it and D2itt denote the total number of highest and second highest signals received
respectively in previous auction periods.
10 We then run the second stage equation
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)
C




variance of the estimated cash balance coefficient from this equation is given by
Var( 2sls) = 
2[Eit( itt -  )
2]




C C12 Just as the case with the OLS estimates, one can obtain more efficient estimates using procedures such as
such as 3SLS and optimal GMM, although one can run into a small sample bias problem with such
estimators - see Altonji and Segal (1994)
13 Again, Hausman (1978) offers a test of the null hypothesis that cash balances are exogenous. 
14 See Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1993) and Staiger and Stock (1997). Staiger and Stock suggest an
examination of the first stage F statistic.  This statistic tests the hypothesis that the instrumental variables
and all other explanatory variables do not enter the first stage regression. Bound et al focus on the joint
significance of the explanatory variables which are excluded from the second stage equation. 
In general, the variance of the estimated coefficient from 2SLS estimation of (9)  may
be larger or smaller than that for the coefficient estimated from the fixed effect model given
by (6). However, the better job that the instrumental variables do in predicting cash balances
in terms of the fit equation, the higher the variance of the predicted cash balances and the
lower the variance of the 2SLS estimates.
12 A major advantage of using data generated from
the laboratory is that these instruments are strictly exogenous since in the design of the
experiment, these variables are chosen independently of the individual and cannot be affected
by the individual.
13 
At this point it is worth comparing the sampling properties of the OLS, FE estimator
and the 2SLS estimator. The OLS and FE estimators are unbiased in small samples if the
error term in (2) (or equation (1)) is normally distributed.  The OLS, FE and 2SLS  estimates
are  consistent  and  asymptotically normal,.independently of whether the error term is
normally distributed. However, there are two caveats concerning the instrumental variables
estimates. First, larger samples are likely to be necessary for the asymptotic distribution
theory to hold than for OLS or FE (see Buse 1992). Second, the instrumental variables
estimates be biased if the instrument variables are weak in the sense of not doing a good job
of predicting the endogenous variable.  In general, the weaker the instruments the greater the
bias of the IV estimate.
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IV. Randomization of Cash Balances
As noted above, the OLS and FE estimates will perform poorly if there is insufficient
variation in cash balances. Further, the 2SLS estimator will perform poorly if the instruments
are weakly correlated with the cash balances. In this section we demonstrate how the
experimenter can alter the experimental design to address all of these problems. Specifically,we introduce a lottery in each period for each participant with payoff zit of the following form
 zit = -a with probability .5      (10)
 zit   = b  with probability .5           
where b > a so the expected payoff is positive. We keep the payoff positive to compensate
individuals for the uncertainty introduced by the lottery. Define 





In terms of our previous notation,
Yit = Cit + Zit 
We rewrite equations (1) and (2)  in terms of Yit as
Bit =  a+ (1 RVit + (2 Y it + (3 t
 -1 + (4 eit + uit        (1')
Bit =  a+ (Yit + uit .                                                (2')
If simultaneity is not an issue, then this randomization will increase the efficiency of OLS
estimation. Now the estimated variance of the OLS estimate of the cash balance effect equals
  
Var( ols) =  
2[Eit(Yit -  )
2]
-1                      (3')
)
g ) s Y
 =   
2[Eit[(Cit -  ) +(Zit  - )]
2]
-1   ) s C Z
which will be smaller (in an expected value sense) than the previous expression in equation
(3). 
If simultaneous equation bias is a problem, the randomization (10) will lessen the
inconsistency of the OLS estimatorplim( ols - () = plim( Eit Cituit) /N) / plim(Eit(Yit -  )
2 /N).      (4')
)
g Y
In (4') we have exploited the fact that Zit is uncorrelated with uit by design, and thus the
inconsistency in (4') is smaller than in (4).
Now consider the FE estimator after randomization. The variance of the FE estimator
is now given by 
Var( fe) = 
2[Eit(Yit -  i)
2]
-1 .                    (6')
)
g ) s Y
 =   
2[Eit[(Cit -  i) +(Zit  - i)]
2]
-1   ) s C Z
Again the variance in (6') is smaller (in an expected value sense) than the variance of the FE
estimate without randomization in (6).
Finally, consider the 2SLS estimator after the randomization in (10). By design, we
are introducing an additional instrument which will be strongly correlated with cash balances
Yit but uncorrelated with the error term in (2') and (1'). The first stage equation for Y it
becomes 
Yit =  A0'+ A1'D1it + A2'D2itt + A3'Zit +w'itt .      (7')
Thus randomization will improve the fit of the first stage equation and thus should reduce
the variance of the 2SLS estimator, as well as improving its small sample properties.
Section V: Experimental Design
Our design involves several minor modifications to that of the affiliated private value
auction experiments described in section II. In order to focus on the role of cash balances we
held e fixed at 12.  The range of [xl, xu] equaled [25,975]. This range is represents a15As noted above, the RNNE bid function will take a different form if the signal is outside this range, and
thus we discard observations for which this occurs. 
significant increase over previous studies  in an attempt to increase the availability of data
for analysis.
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Subjects were recruited for a session consisting of a series of thirty auction periods.
In each auction period, a single unit of a commodity was sold to the high bidder at the high
bid price, with bidders submitting sealed bids for the item.  The high bidder earned profits
equal to her value less the amount bid; other bidders earned zero for the auction period. At
the conclusion of the auction period all the bidders were entered in to a lottery which (as
explained in the preceding section) allows for re-randomization each period. The values of
a and b were set at $1.00 and -0.50¢ respectively.  The subjects were told that the lottery was
designed simply as a source of extra earnings and that over the course of the experiment they
would earn positive average profits of 25¢ each period from the lottery.  Furthermore, they
were told that the outcomes in the lottery were completely unrelated to the auction outcomes
(which they were).
In each auction period there were two markets in operation and the number of bidders
participating in a market was constant within an experiment.  Each period the subjects were
randomly assigned to one of the two markets each period to avoid any possible reputation
effects.  Subjects were recruited from undergraduate economics classes at the University of
Pittsburgh.  A total of five sessions with 48 different subjects were run. 
The number of bidders participating in the auction was the sole item that varied
between the experimental sessions.  For sessions 1, 4 and 5, eight subjects were recruited and
two markets of four operated each period.  The remaining sessions recruited twelve subjects
overall and two markets of six operated in each period. We varied the number of bidders
between sessions since theory suggests that as the number of rivals within an auction
increases, individuals will bid closer to their resale value. The distribution underlying the
resale values, lottery payoffs, the value of e, the number of competing bidders, and the
interval [xl, xu] were common knowledge.  
Each subject was given a starting cash balances of $7.00.  In the event that an
individual mistakenly entered a bid that would cause her cash balances to become negative,16   The instructions are included in Appendix 1.
17  These individuals are subject number 1 and 10 in session 3 and subject number 5 in session 4.  The latter
two subjects took approximately 15 rounds to determine that making a profit was more important.
18 In our experimental design we held , fixed at 12 in all the sessions.  Thus, we remove it from all of our
estimates of (1') since it is collinear with the constant. 
she was given a new starting cash balance of $7.00 but had $5.00 subtracted from her end-of-
experiment earnings. At the end of each auction period, all bids were posted from highest to
lowest, along with the corresponding signal values (bidder identification numbers were
suppressed) and the profits of the high bidder in their market was reported to all bidders. The
subjects  were  given three practice periods to accustom themselves to the rules and
accounting procedures. Each subject was given a $5.00 participation fee
16.
For the purposes of data analysis,  we restrict the data to the interval xl  + e ￿ xi ￿ xu -
e since the RNNE bid function will change outside this interval. We also eliminate all
observations which constitute bidding errors.  These bidding errors include all bids above the
resale value and those bids below the resale value - (2*e).  It should be noted that there were
three individuals who bid above their resale value repeatedly as they did not understand the
rules and believed it was more important to win the auction rather than make a profit
17.
Table 2 shows the relationship between average profits and number of bidders by
experiment.  It is interesting to note that in experiment session 1, which contained four
bidders, average profits were the lowest.  In fact profits across all session with four bidders
were only approximately 45¢ higher when average profits in sessions where the number of
bidders was six. This difference in average profits by session size is substantially less than
that which is predicted by theory.
VI:  Econometric Results
Table 3 presents the OLS estimates for the linear bid function given by equation (1')
in column (1)
18. Column (2) contains the random-effects estimates of (1'); these are GLS
estimates for the case of the error components model (5) where hi  is treated as a component
of the error term. Column (3) contains the fixed effect estimates. Note that all three estimates
of the cash balance effect are negative and statistically significant at standard confidence
levels, but the OLS estimate is substantially smaller in absolute value than the RE and FE19 The standard errors for the OLS results have not been corrected for correlation across bids for the same
individual, and thus should be considered approximate. We will address this issue in future work.
20 The number of bidders variable drops out of the fixed effect specification since it is constant across
individuals. However, we can use the approach of Hausman and Taylor (1981) to recover this coefficient
and will report on this calculation in a future draft
effect estimates.
19 A Hausman (1978) test indicates that one cannot reject the random effects
specification in favor of the fixed effects specification. Thus the endogeneity of cash
balances does not appear to be a problem, at least after the randomization (10). Perhaps
surprisingly, the number of bidder does not appear to affect bidding behavior.
20 Of course,
these results may simply indicate the need for a better experimental design with respect to
this variable, especially given the wide confidence interval for this coefficient implied by the
parameter estimates.
Before discussing  the 2SLS estimates, we present some summary information on the
instruments.  To review we are using as instruments i) the number of previous periods that
an  individual  received  the  highest  signal,  ii)  the  number  of  previous periods that an
individual received the second highest signal and iii) previous net lottery earnings
Table 4 indicates that in our data individuals receiving the highest or second highest signal
made the highest bid in over ninety-five per cent of the auctions. Table 5 shows the raw
correlation between each instrument and cash balances. Each of the instruments has a
substantial correlation with the potentially endogenous variable cash balances.
Table 6 shows three first stage equations for cash balances.. Column (1) contains the
results when we use all three of instruments. Column (2) presents the results when we use
only the highest signal and second highest variables as instruments, while column (3)
presents  the  results  when  we  use  only  the  lottery  earnings  as  instruments.  In each
specification the instruments are very statistically significant. Thus each would be considered
a ‘good instrument’.  Table 7 presents the 2SLS estimates for the same three specifications
of the instrument set. In each case the cash balance coefficient is positive and statistically
insignificant. These results are in sharp contrast to those presented in Table 3 for the OLS,
RE and FE estimates. The difference in the estimates between Table 3 and Table 7 may
indicate that the sample size is too small to avoid bias in  2SLS estimation. However, the
difference in the results  may also indicate model misspecification.We investigated two possible sources of misspecification. First, we considered the
possibility that the relationship between bidding behavior and cash balances is nonlinear. by
also including a term in cash balances squared. This squared term in cash balances never
approached statistical significance at conventional confidence levels. 
We also investigated the possibility that learning and adjustment process was
misspecified since cash balances are trending upward as the number of periods increases. We
included dummy variables for five groups of auction periods (after the practice periods): 1)
periods 1 to5; 2) periods 6 to10; 3) periods 11 to 15; 4) periods 16 to 20; and 5) periods 21
to 25. (Thus periods 26 to 30 are the control periods.) The results for the OLS, RE and FE
specification are contained in Table 8. These results indicate that only the first dummy
variable (for periods 1 to 5) is significantly different from zero, suggesting that all adjustment
takes place in the first five periods. Therefore we reestimated the model replacing the
(inverse) time trend with a dummy variable for the first five periods. The OLS, RE and FE
estimates are in Table 9. The cash balance variable is still negative for each estimation
method but the RE and FE estimates fall considerably in absolute value. Further, the cash
balance variable is not statistically significant when we use OLS, and the RE and FE
estimates are now at the margin of statistical significance (i.e. significant at the ten per cent
level but not at the five per cent level). Thus our results for cash balances are somewhat
sensitive  to  how  we  model  the  adjustment  process. Our results also suggest that
experimenters  may  wish  to  consider  flexible  alternatives  to  simple  time  trends when
analyzing bidding behavior.  
We next consider 2SLS estimation with a time dummy for the first five periods. The
first stage equations are contained in Table 9. We see that the instruments continue to play
an extremely strong role in the first stage equations. The 2SLS estimates are contained in
Table 10. Again they are positive and do not come close to being statistically significant at
standard confidence levels.
VII:  Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the role of individual cash balances on bidding behavior
in affiliated private value auctions. We argue that previous studies have suffered from twoproblems. First, cash balances are likely to be endogenous in standard experimental designs.
Thus we discuss econometric estimators aimed at dealing with this problem. Second,
standard experimental designs are likely to produce insufficient variation in cash balances
to enable researchers to precisely estimate the effect of this variable on bidding behavior.
Thus we develop and implement an experimental design which increases the variation in
cash balances. This experimental design involves partially randomizing cash balances each
period and will also mitigate potential endogeneity problems.
Given  our  experimental  design,  we  find  that  random  effects and fixed effect
estimators generally provide negative and statistically significant estimates of the cash
balance effect, although the result is somewhat sensitive to how we model the adjustment
process. Since we do not have comparable experimental data which does not involve
randomization, we cannot precisely isolate the effect of randomization. However, it is
interesting to note that our results using randomized data suggest a much stronger role for
cash balances than previous work in affiliated private value auctions. Finally, we find that
2SLS estimates are imprecise and may suffer from small sample bias, even though the
instruments we use are exogenous by design and strongly correlated with the endogenous
regressor.
Our results suggest several avenues for additional work. First, it will be interesting
to consider using larger sample sizes in estimation. Such samples may reduce bias in the
2SLS estimates as well as increasing the precision of our random effects and fixed effects
estimates, particularly when we use time dummies to model the adjustment process. Second,
we will consider more efficient simultaneous equation methods such as three stage least
squares. Third, we are currently investigating  the role of cash balances in common value
auctions using estimation methods and an experimental design similar to those presented
above. Fourth, it will be interesting to consider experimental designs which allow us to
estimate the effect of the number of bidders with greater precision.
 21  The average profits and number of rounds report information from the rounds where the individual who
earned the item (high bidder) bid below their resale value.  Thee last column provides the average lottery
earnings in the entire session.
Table 1:  Ranking of Signals Received and Auction Round Winners in KHL (1987)
Rank of Signal
Received in a Given
Round
Number of Auction
Winners in  Rounds
Restricted to  




to xl +e ￿ xi  ￿ xu -e





6 (lowest) 0 0




































5 4 60 $2.66
(1.64)
0.2625
(.751463)Table 3:   OLS, Random Effects and Fixed Effects Estimates of the Bid Equation
(Standard errors in parentheses, N= 1350)
Specification Ordinary least
squares





































Winners in  Rounds
Restricted to   
 xl +e ￿ xi ￿ xu -e
Percentage of Auction
Winners in All Rounds
Restricted to
xl +e ￿ xi ￿ xu -e





6  0 0
Table 5: Correlation Between the Level of the Cash Balances and the Instrumental
Variables (N=1309)
Instrument Correlation
Total lottery earnings in previous periods
(Zit) additions to cash balances
0.5934Total number of high signals received
previously
0.6919
Total number of second highest signal
received previously
0.4511
Table 6:  First Stage Estimates.  Dependent Variable is Level of Cash Balances Prior to
the Bid (Standard errors in parentheses, N= 1309)



















































First Stage F statistic 370.295 289.6305 297.738Table 7:  Two Stage Least Squares Estimates.  Dependent Variable is Level of Bid
Endogenous Variables are the level of cash balances prior to the bid (Standard errors in
parentheses, N= 1309)





























































cash balancesTable 8:  Econometric Estimates of the Factors which Influence The Level of Bids. 
Dependent Variable is Level of Bid (Standard errors in parentheses, N= 1350)
Specification Ordinary least
squares































































(.3371702)Table 9:   Econometric Estimates of the Factors which Influence The Level of Bids. 
Dependent Variable is Level of Bid (Standard errors in parentheses, N= 1350)
Specification Ordinary least
squares
































Table 10:  First Stage Estimates.  Dependent Variable is Level of Cash Balances Prior to
the Bid (Standard errors in parentheses, N= 1309)






















































Table 11:  Two Stage Least Squares Estimates.  Dependent Variable is Level of Bid
Endogenous Variables are the level of cash balances prior to the bid (Standard errors in
parentheses, N= 1309)





























































cash balancesAppendix 1:  Instructions
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making.  Funding for
this research has been provided by the University of Pittsburgh.  The instructions are
simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you may earn a
CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MONEY which will be PAID TO YOU IN CASH at
the end of the experiment.
1. In this experiment we will create a market in which you will act as buyers of a
commodity in a sequence of trading periods.  A single unit of the commodity will be
auctioned off in each trading period.  There will be several trading periods.
2. Your task is to submit bids for the commodity along with several other buyers.  In
each trading period you will be assigned a RESALE VALUE for the commodity. 
This indicates the value to you of purchasing the item.  This value may be thought of
as the amount you would receive if you were to resell the unit.  The process of
determining the resale values will be described in Sections 7 and 8 below.
3. The high bidder earns the item and makes a profit equal to the difference between
his/her resale value and the high bid.  That is
(Resale Value) – (High Bid) = Profits
for the high bidder.  If you do not make the high bid on the item, you neither gain nor
lose money from bidding on the item.  Note that bids in excess of your resale value
will result in losses if you earn the item.  Also note that if you earn the item at a price
equal to its (your) resale value your profit will be zero.
4. At the end of each trading period you will automatically be entered in to a lottery
where you have a 50 – 50 chance of either earning $1.00 or losing 50¢.  Over the
course of the experiment you should earn positive average profits of 25¢ each auction
period.  Earnings from the lottery are totally unrelated to the auction outcomes.  They
are just a source of extra earnings.5. You will be given a starting cash balance of $7.00.  Your earnings from the auction
and your lottery earnings will be added to this starting cash balance with your end of
experiment balance paid to you in CASH at the end of the experiment.  In addition
you will receive $5.00, as promised, for participating in the study.
6. During each auction period you will be bidding in a market in which 4 other
participants are also bidding.  There will be two separate markets operating
simultaneously in each auction period.  The market to which you are assigned is
randomly determined prior to the start of each auction period so that the other bidders
in your market will change between auction periods.
7. Resale values will be assigned as follows.  First we will randomly draw a number
between $25 and $975 inclusively.  Call this number D*.  For each auction any value
between $25 and $975 has an equally likely chance of being drawn as D*.
8. Once D* is determined, resale values will be selected from an interval whose lower
bound is D* - 12, and whose upper bound is D* + 12.  Any value within the interval
has an  equally likely chance of being drawn and being assigned to one of you as your
resale value.  For example, suppose that D* is $648.50.  Then each of you will receive
a resale value which will consist of a randomly drawn number between $636.50 (D* -
12 = 648.50 – 12) and $660.50 (D* + 12 = 648.50 + 12).  Any number in this interval
has an equally likely chance of being drawn as D*.
9. Your resale values are strictly private information and are not to be revealed to
anyone else.  At the end of each trading session all of the bids in your market will be
presented on your computer screen in descending order along with the resale values
that correspond to these bids.  You will also be told the profits of the high bidder in
your market.
10. As already noted your cash profits depend upon your ability to buy a unit at a price
below your resale value.  There are clear tradeoffs in deciding what to bid: the lower
you bid relative to your resale value, the higher your profits should you be the high
bidder, but the lower your chances are of being the high bidder.  Further, the exact
nature of this tradeoff depends on what other bidders are doing in terms of these
tradeoffs also.11. No one may bid less than $0.00 for the item.  Bids must be rounded to the nearest
penny to be accepted.  In the case of ties for the high bidder, the computer will
randomly determine who will earn the item.
12. You are not to reveal your bids, or profits, nor are you to speak to any other subject
while the experiment is in progress.  This is important to the validity of the study and
will not be tolerated.
13. As promised, everyone will receive $5 irrespective of their earnings for participating
in the experiment. 
14. We will have three practice periods to familiarize you with the procedures and
accounting rules.  This will be followed by 30 periods played for cash.
15. Review. Let’s summarize the main points:
- The high bidder in each period receives a profit equal to his/her resale value
minus the bid.  Everyone else in the period earns $0.
- Profits from the auctions and lottery earnings will be added or subtracted from
your cash balances.
- All bids must be greater than $0.00
- D* in each market will be between $25 and $975.  Resale values will be drawn
between D* - 12 and D* + 12.
- You will be randomly assigned to one of two markets each period.
- There will be 6 bidders in total in your market.
Are there any questions?Bibliography
Altonji, Joseph, and Segal, L. M. (1994).  Small Sample Bias in GMM Estimation of 
Covariance Structures, NBER Technical Working Paper no. 156.
Arrelano, Manuel, and Bond, Stephen (1991).  Some Tests of Specification for Panel
Data: Monte – Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations,
Review of Economic Studies, 58, pp. 277 – 297.
Bound, J, Jaeger, D. A. and Baker, R. M. (1995), “Problems with Instrumental Variables
Estimation When the Correlation Between the Instruments and the Endogenous
Explanatory Variable is Weak,” J. American Statistical Association, vol. 90, 443-
450.
Bowden, R. J. and Turkington, D. A. (1984), Instrumental Variables, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Brundy, James M., and Jorgenson, Dale W. (1971).  Efficient Estimation of
Simultaneous Equations by Instrumental Variables, Review of Economics and
Statistics, 53, pp. 207 – 224.
Buse, A. (1992).  The Bias of Instrumental Variable Estimators, Econometrica, Vol. 60, 
pp. 173-180.
Chamberlain, Gary (1984).  “Panel Data,” in Handbook of Econometrics, vol.  II, edited 
by Z. Grilches and M. Intriligator, pp. 1247 – 1318.  Amsterdam: North–Holland.
Cox, James C., Smith, Vernon L., and Walker, James M. (1992).  Theory and
Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions: Comment, American Economic Review, 82,
pp. 1392-1412.
 
Hansen, Robert G., and Lott, John (1991). The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in 
Common Value Auctions: Comment, American Economic Review, 81, pp.  347 –
361.
Hausman, Jerry (1978). Specification Tests in Econometrics, Econometrica, 46, pp. 
 1251  – 1271Hausman, Jerry, and Taylor, William (1981).  Panel Data and Unobservable Individual
Effects, Econometrica, 49, pp. 1377  – 1398
Hsiao, Cheng (1986).  Analysis of Panel Data, Econometric Society Monographs No. 11, 
New York:  Cambridge University Press,
Kagel, John H (1995).  “Auctions,” in Handbook of Experimental Economics, edited by 
John H Kagel, and Alvin E. Roth, pp. 501 - 586.  Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Kagel, John H., and Roth, Alvin E. (1992).  Theory and Misbehavior in First-Price
Auctions: Comment, American Economic Review, 82, pp.  1379 – 1391.
Kagel, John H., and Levin, Dan (1991). The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in 
Common Value Auctions: Reply, American Economic Review, 81, pp.  362 –369.
Kagel, John H., Harstrad, Ronald M., and Levin, Dan (1987).  Information Impact and 
Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values:  A Laboratory
 Study.  Econometrica, 55, pp. 1275 – 1304.
Kagel, John H., and Levin, Dan (1986). The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in 
Common Value Auctions, American Economic Review, 76, pp.  894 – 920.
Matyas, Laszlo (1996).  “Error Components Models” in The Econometrics of Panel Data, 
edited by Laszlo Matyas and Patrick Sevestre, pp. 50 – 76.  Boston:  Kluwer 
Academic Press.
Sevestre, Patrick and Trognon, Alain (1996).  “Linear Models with Random Regressors” 
in The Econometrics of Panel Data, edited by Laszlo Matyas and Patrick
Sevestre, pp. 100 – 119.  Boston:  Kluwer Academic Press.
Staiger, Douglas, and Stock, James (1997).  Instrumental Variables Regression with
Weak Instruments,"  Econometrica, 65 (3) pp.  557 - 586.